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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals is conferred with jurisdiction over 
the instant appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (2) (e) 
(2002) . 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES / STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Whether appointed trial counsel denied Mr. Jacobsen of 
the Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel 
by failing to request that prospective juror Progess be removed 
for cause or failing to remove him by peremptory challenge. To 
make such a showing, a defendant must show, first, that counsel 
rendered a deficient performance, falling below an objective 
standard of reasonable professional judgment, and, second, that 
counsel's performance was prejudicial. Bundy v. DeLand, 763 P. 2d 
803 (Utah 1988). The appellate court reviews such a claim as a 
matter of law. State v. Maestas, 1999 UT 32, f20, 984 P.2d 376. 
Preservation of Issue Citation or Statement of Grounds for Review: 
Issues involving claims of ineffective assistance of counsel 
constitute an exception to the preservation rule and as such may 
be raised for the first time on appeal. 
2. Whether the trial court committed plain error by not 
pursuing the dismissal of prospective juror Progess similar to 
that of the other prospective jurors. In State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 
1 
1201 (Utah 1993), this Court outlined the following principles 
involved in determining whether "plain error" exists: 
In general, to establish the existence of 
plain error and to obtain appellate relief 
from an alleged error that was not properly 
objected to, the appellant must show the 
following: (1) An error exists; (11) the 
error should have been obvious to the trial 
court; and (111) the error is harmful, i.e., 
absent the error, there is a reasonable 
likelihood of a more favorable outcome for 
the appellant, or phrased differently, our 
confidence in the verdict is undermined. 
Id. at 1208-09. 
Preservation of Issue Citation or Statement of Grounds for Review: 
Issues involving plain error constitute an exception to the 
preservation rule and as such may be raised for the first time on 
appeal. 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY 
The constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, 
regulations, or case law whose interpretation is determinative, 
are set out verbatim, with the appropriate citation, in the body 
and arguments of the instant Brief of Appellant. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case involves the failure to remove a prospective ^uror 
for cause or by peremptory challenge. These failures precluded 
Defendant of the right to a fair trial. 
Defendant was charged with Abuse or Neglect of a Disabled or 
Elder Adult and Assault. He pleaded not guilty to the charges. 
Defendant subsequently appeared for a jury trial. At the 
conclusion of trial, Defendant was convicted on both counts. 
On that same day, the trial court sentenced Defendant as 
follows- Based on the conviction of Abuse or Neglect of a 
Disabled or Elder Adult, the trial court sentenced Defendant to a 
term of 365 days in the Davis County Jail, of which it suspended 
325 days; and as to the conviction of Assault, the trial court 
sentenced Defendant to a term of 180 days m the Davis County 
Jail, which the trial court suspended. Defendant thereafter filed 
a timely pro se notice of appeal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Mr. Jacobsen was charged with Abuse or Neglect of a 
Disabled or Elder Adult in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-
111(3) (a) , a class A misdemeanor, and Assault in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-5-102, a class B misdemeanor (R. 1-2). See 
Information, R. 1-2, a true and correct copy of which is attached 
hereto as Addendum A. 
2. On September 29, 2 003, Mr. Jacobsen appeared before the 
district court and pleaded not guilty (R. 10-11) . 
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3. Mr. Jacobsen appeared for a jury trial on April 16, 2004 
(R. 67-70) . 
4. During jury selection, the trial court asked the 
prospective jurors whether any of them have close friends or 
family members that work in law enforcement (R. 117:18:19-20). 
Prospective juror John Richard Progess responded that he had a 
"close friend that's on the Utah Highway Patrol." (R. 117:21:14-
15) . 
5. The trial court asked Mr. Progess if he would ube 
inclined to give more credibility to a police officer who 
testifies as opposed to a lay witness in court." (R. 117:22:1-3). 
Mr. Progess responded, "I don't know if I'd give more credibility, 
but I think they probably pay attention to detail a little bit 
more than the average person." (R. 117:22:4-6). 
6. The trial court then inquired, "At this stage of the 
proceedings, would your tendency be to favor the prosecution over 
the defense? (R. 117:22:7-8). Mr. Progess responded, uNo." (R. 
117:22:9) . 
7. The final six persons selected to sit on the jury 
included Mr. Progess (R. 117:39:14-16). 
8. At the conclusion of trial, the jury convicted Mr. 
Jacobsen on both counts (R. 117:132:2-8). 
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9. That same day, the trial court imposed sentence. (R. 
68) . Based on the conviction of Abuse or Neglect of a Disabled or 
Elder Adult, the trial court sentenced Mr. Jacobsen to a term of 
365 days in the Davis County Jail, of which it suspended 325 days. 
(R. 68). As to the conviction of Assault, the trial court 
sentenced Mr Jacobsen to a term of 18 0 days in the Davis County 
Jail, which the trial court suspended. (R. 68-69). See Sentence, 
Judgment, Commitment, R. 67-70, a true and correct copy of which 
is attached hereto as Addendum B. 
10. Mr. Jacobsen filed a timely pro se notice of appeal (R. 
71) . 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. Trial counsel denied Mr. Jacobsen of his Sixth Amendment 
right to the effective assistance of counsel by failing to request 
that prospective juror Progess be removed for cause or failing to 
remove him by peremptory challenge. Trial counsel's failure to 
request that Progess be removed for cause or failing to remove him 
by peremptory challenge fell below an objective standard of 
reasonable professional judgment. The record demonstrates that 
trial counsel was so inattentive or indifferent during the jury 
selection process that the failure to remove Progess was not the 
result of a conscious choice or preference. In fact, except for 
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his brief introduction to the jury, trial counsel made no effort 
to object or comment during jury selection. 
But for counsel's unprofessional error of failing to request 
that Progess be removed for cause or failing to remove him by 
peremptory challenge, the result at trial would have been 
different. Had trial counsel objected, the trial court, based on 
questioning utilized with other prospective jurors, would have 
erred by not removing Progess. 
2. The trial court committed plain error by not pursuing 
the dismissal of prospective juror Progess similar to that of the 
other prospective jurors. The brial court erred by failing to 
pursue further questioning of and dismissal of prospective juror 
Progess even though the trial court pursued such questioning of 
and dismissal of other prospective jurors. The error should have 
been obvious in light of the dismissal of the other prospective 
jurors during jury selection. Finally, the error was harmful 
because it denied Mr. Jacobsen of the right to a fair trial. 
6 
ARGUMENTS 
I. TRIAL COUNSEL DENIED MR, JACOBSEN OF HIS SIXTH 
AMENDMENT RIGHT TO THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF 
COUNSEL BY FAILING TO REQUEST THAT PROSPECTIVE 
JUROR PROGESS BE DISMISSED FOR CAUSE OR FOR 
FAILING TO REMOVE HIM BY PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE. 
In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct 2052 
(1984), the United States Supreme Court established a two-prong 
test for determining when a defendant's Sixth Amendment1 right to 
effective assistance of counsel has been denied. Id. at 687, 104 
S.Ct. at 2064. As adopted by Utah courts, this test requires a 
defendant to show "first, that his counsel rendered a deficient 
performance in some demonstrable manner, which performance fell 
below an objective standard of reasonable professional judgment 
and, second, that counsel's performance prejudiced the defendant." 
Bundy v. Deland, 763 P.2d 803, 805 (Utah 1988); State v. Perry, 
899 P.2d 1232, 1239 (Utah Ct. App. 1995); State v. Wright, 893 
P.2d 1113, 1119 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). " [T] he right to the 
effective assistance of counsel is recognized not for its own 
sake, but because of the effect it has on the ability of the 
accused to receive a fair trial," or, in this case, a fair 
xThe Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution states in 
relevant part that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall 
enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his 
defence." 
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sentencing. Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 369, 113 S.Ct. 
838, 842, (1993) . 
To satisfy the first prong of the test, a defendant must 
"
xidentify the acts or omissions' which, under the circumstances, 
x
 show that counsel's representation fell below an objective 
standard of reasonableness.'" State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182, 186 
(Utah 1990) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690, 688, 104 S.Ct. 
at 2066, 2064 (footnotes omitted)). A defendant must "overcome 
the strong presumption that trial counsel rendered adequate 
assistance and exercised reasonable professional judgment." State 
v. Bullock, 791 P.2d 155, 159-60 (Utah 1989), cert, denied, 497 
U.S. 1024, 110 S.Ct. 3270 (1990). 
To show prejudice under the second prong of the test, a 
defendant must proffer sufficient evidence to support "a 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional 
errors, the result of the proceedings would have been different." 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2068; Templin, 805 P.2d 
at 187. "A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to 
undermine confidence in the outcome." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 
695, 104 S.Ct. at 2069; Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P. 2d 516, 522 (Utah 
1994); State v. Frame, 723 P.2d 401, 405 (Utah 1986). 
The appellate court presumes that trial counsel's lack of 
objection to, or failure to remove, a particular juror was the 
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result of a plausibly justifiable conscious choice or preference. 
See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052 
(1984). However, the Strickland presumption of effectiveness is 
rebuttable. A defendant may rebut the presumption by showing: 
(1) that trial counsel was so inattentive or indifferent during 
the jury selection process that the failure to remove a 
prospective juror was not the product of a conscious choice or 
preference; (2) that a prospective juror expressed bias so strong 
or unequivocal that no plausible countervailing subjective 
preference could justify failure to remove that juror; or (3) that 
there is some other specific evidence clearly demonstrating that 
trial counsel's choice was not plausibly justifiable. State v. 
Litherland, 2000 UT 76, f25, 12 P.3d 92. 
During jury selection in the instant case, the trial court 
asked the prospective jurors whether any of them have close 
friends or family members that work in law enforcement (R. 
117:18:19-20). Prospective juror John Richard Progess responded 
that he had a "close friend that's on the Utah Highway Patrol." 
(R. 117:21:14-15). 
The trial court asked Progess if he would "be inclined to 
give more credibility to a police officer who testifies as opposed 
to a lay witness in court." (R. 117:22:1-3). Progess responded, 
"I don't know if I'd give more credibility, but I think they 
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probably pay attention to detail a little bit more than the 
average person." (R. 117:22:4-6). 
The trial court then inquired, "At this stage of the 
proceedings, would your tendency be to favor the prosecution over 
the defense? (R. 117:22:7-8). Progess responded, "No." (R. 
117:22:9) The final six persons selected to sit on the jury 
included Progess (R. 117:39:14-16), who ultimately served as the 
foreperson of the jury who convicted Mr. Jacobsen (R. 57, 
Verdict). 
Trial counsel's failure to request that Progess be removed 
for cause or failing to remove him by peremptory challenge fell 
below an objective standard of reasonable professional judgment. 
The record demonstrates that trial counsel was so inattentive or 
indifferent during the jury selection process that the failure to 
remove Progess was not the result of a conscious choice or 
preference. In fact, except for the brief introduction of himself 
to the jury, trial counsel made no effort to object or otherwise 
comment during jury selection. 
But for counsel's unprofessional error of failing to request 
that Progess be removed for cause or failing to remove him by 
peremptory challenge, the result at trial would have been 
different. Had trial counsel objected, the trial court, based on 
questioning utilized with other prospective jurors (see R. 117:22-
10 
23 (prospective juror Munson); R. 117:27:4-12 (prospective juror 
Johnson); R. 117:30-31 (prospective juror Northrop),2 would have 
erred by not removing Progess. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PLAIN ERROR BY NOT 
PURSUING THE DISMISSAL OF PROSPECTIVE JUROR 
PROGESS SIMILAR TO THAT OF THE OTHER PROSPECTIVE 
JURORS. 
In State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201 (Utah 1993), this Court 
outlined the following principles involved in determining whether 
"plain error'' exists: 
In general, to establish the existence of 
plain error and to obtain appellate relief 
from an alleged error that was not properly 
objected to, the appellant must show the 
following: (i) An error exists; (ii) the 
error should have been obvious to the trial 
court; and (iii) the error is harmful, i.e., 
absent the error, there is a reasonable 
likelihood of a more favorable outcome for 
the appellant, or phrased differently, our 
confidence in the verdict is undermined. 
Id. at 1208-09; see also State v. Portillo, 914 P.2d 724, 726 
(Utah Ct. App. 1996); and State v. Tenney, 913 P.2d 750 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1996) . According to State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 121-22 
(Utah 1989), "in most circumstances, the term 'manifest injustice' 
[found in Utah R. Crim. P. 19(c)] is synonymous with the 'plain 
2A portion of the jury selection proceedings is attached hereto 
as Addendum C. See also Argument II, pages 12 through 13. 
11 
error' standard expressly provided in Utah Rule of Evidence 103(d) 
In the instant case, the trial court erred by failing to 
pursue further questioning of and dismissal of prospective juror 
Progess even though the trial court pursued such questioning of 
and dismissal of other prospective jurors. The error should have 
been obvious in light of the dismissal of the other prospective 
jurors during jury selection. For example, prospective juror Bart 
Alan Munson informed the trial court that he had worked with 
several Farmington City police and that he is close friends with 
others from the sheriff's office (R. 117:22:12-15). The court 
then asked him if he would "be more inclined at this stage to give 
their testimony more credibility simply because they're with the 
Davis County Sheriff's Office?" (R. 117:22:17-19). To which 
Munson responded, "I don't think so." (R. 117:22:20). The trial 
court questioned Munson further by asking, "If you were seated 
here at defense table as the defendant, and somebody is in the 
jury with a close relationship between an agency who will be 
testifying in that trial, would you be uncomfortable?" (R. 
117:23:6-9). Munson responded, "Yeah, I think so.", after which 
the court excused Munson (R. 117:23:10-14). Moreover, the trial 
court released prospective juror Jessica R. Carlos upon being 
informed that she could "possibly" be influenced by the fact that 
12 
her brother-in-law is an officer for Sunset City (R. 117:26:11-
25). Finally, the error was harmful because denied Mr. Jacobsen 
of the right to a fair trial. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Mr. Jacobsen respectfully requests 
that this Court reverse and remand the case to the district court 
for a new trial and for any further proceedings consistent with 
this Court's instructions as set forth in its opinion. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 26th day of February, 2006. 
ARNOLD fc WIGGINS, P.C. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, SCOTT L WIGGINS, hereby certify that I personally caused 
to be mailed by First-Class Mail, postage prepaid, two (2) true 
and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT to the 
following on this 5 day of March, 2006: 
Mr. Brandon L. Poll 
Deputy Davis County Attorney 
800 West State Street 
P.O. Box 618 
Farmington, UT 84 02 5 
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Addendum B: Sentence, Judgment, Commitment 
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Tab A 
MELVIN C. WILSON 
Davis County Attorney 
P.O. Box 618 
800 West State Street 
Farmington UT 84025 
Telephone: (801)451-4300 
Fax: (801)451-4328 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF DAVIS, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
RONALD KENT JACOBSEN 
DOB: 05/01/1954, 
Defendant. 
Bail: 
INFORMATION 
Case No. 
OTN14237184 ICU 
The undersigned prosecutor states on information and belief that the defendant, on 
or about September 26, 2003 at County of Davis, State of Utah, committed the crimes of: 
COUNT 1 
ABUSE OR NEGLECT OF A DISABLED OR ELDER ADULT, (173) 76-5-
111 (3)(a) UCA, class A misdemeanor, as follows: That at the time and place aforesaid the 
defendant under circumstances other than those likely to produce death or serious physical 
injury, intentionally or knowingly caused a disabled or elder adult to suffer physical injury, 
abuse, or neglect. 
COUNT 2 
ASSAULT, (6) 76-5-102 UCA, class B misdemeanor, as follows: That at the 
time and place aforesaid the defendant did attempt, with unlawful force or violence, to do bodily 
injury to another; did threaten, accompanied by a show of immediate force or violence, to do 
bodily injury to another; or did commit an act, with unlawful force or violence, that caused 
bodily injury to another or created a substantial risk of bodily injury to another. 
This information is based on evidence obtained from witness Phil Rogers. 
PROBABLE CAUSE STATEMENT: The undersigned prosecutor is a Deputy 
Davis County Attorney and has received information from the investigating officer, Phil Rogers 
of the North Salt Lake Police Department, and the Information herein is based upon such 
personal observations and investigation of said officer. 
On September 26, 2003 defendant assaulted the victim, a disabled adult, hitting 
him in the face and chest. 
Authorized September 29, 2003. 
for presentment and filing: 
MELVIN C. WILSON 
Davis Cdunty Attorney 
Deputy Davis County Attorney 
TabB 
SLED 
AHK 2 I 2004 
2nd District - Farmington COURT 
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SECOND 
DISTRICT nnng-r 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
RONALD KENT JACOBSEN, 
Defendant, 
Custody: DCJ 
MINUTES 
JURY TRIAL 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
Case No: 031701596 MO 
Judge: DARWIN C. HANSEN 
Date: April 16, 2004 
PRESENT 
Clerk: karensd 
Prosecutor: POLL, BRANDON L 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): ARRINGTON, C MARKLEY 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: May 1, 1954 
Video 
Tape Count: 9:05 
CHARGES 
Criminal Sentence, Judgment, Commitment @J 
JD11595036 
031701596 JACOBSEN,RONALD KENT 
1. ABUSE OF DISABLED OR ELDER ADULT - Class A Misdemeanor 
- Disposition: 04/16/2004 Guilty 
2. SIMPLE ASSAULT - Class B Misdemeanor 
- Disposition: 04/16/2004 Guilty 
TRIAL 
Oath to Jurors on Voir Dire Examination is administered. 
Jury selection concludes. 
Brandon Poll, prosecutor for the State, introduces himself and 
lists his witnesse. 
Mr. Arrington introduces himself and lists potential witnesses. 
Counsel pass the jury for cause. 
Premptory challenge is administered and the jury is selected. 
Oath to jurors impaneled to try a case is administered. 
Court takes a recess and reconvenes at 10:31 a.m. 
Preliminary jury instructions are given. 
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Case No: 031701596 
Date: Apr 16, 2004 
The Information is read. 
Mr. Poll makes opening statements to the Court. 
Mr. Arrington makes opening statements to the Court. 
State's witness Ronald G. Jacobsen Sr. is sworn and testifies. 
Cross examination by Mr. Arrington. 
The witness is excused. 
State's witness Phil Rogers is sworn and testifies. 
States exhibit 4, 2, 3, 1 are offered and received. 
Cross examination by Mr. Arrington. 
The witness is excused. 
The State rests. 
The Court takes a lunch break at 11:49 and reconvenes at 1:22 p.m. 
Mr. Arrington states they will have no witnesses testify and they 
rest their case. 
Jury instructions are given. 
Court recesses at 1:31 and reconvenes at 1:38. 
Mr. Poll gives closing statements. 
Mr. Arrington gives closing statements. 
The Oath is given to the Bailiff. 
The Jury leaves to begin deliberations at 2:40 p.m. 
Court reconvenes at 3:25 p.m. 
The verdict is read and when polled, the jury's decision was 
unanimous. 
Defendant is found guilty on both counts. Defendant waives the 
waiting period and requests sentencing today. 
The State recommends Defendant be ordered into alcohol treatment 
and there is a concern as to where Defendant will live upon 
release. They recommend a period of time before he returns to the 
home of his parents. The original order of no contact was 
lifted in October. Defendant has served 35 days in the Davis 
County Jail. He failed to appear in November 2003 and a warrant 
was issued. He's been in jail since arrested because of failure to 
make bail. 
SENTENCE JAIL 
Based on the defendant's conviction of ABUSE OF DISABLED OR ELDER 
ADULT a Class A Misdemeanor, the defendant is sentenced to a term 
of 365 day(s) in the Davis County Jail. The total time suspended 
for this charge is 325 day(s). 
Based on the defendant's conviction of SIMPLE ASSAULT a Class B 
Misdemeanor, the defendant is sentenced to a term of 180 day(s) in 
the Davis County Jail. The total time suspended for this charge is 
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Case No: 031701596 
Date: Apr 16, 2004 
180 day(s). 
Commitment is to begin immediately. 
Credit is granted for time served. 
Credit is granted for 35 day(s) previously served. 
SENTENCE FINE 
Charge # 1 Fine: $8050.00 
Suspended: $7550.00 
Surcharge: $243.24 
Due: $500.00 
Charge # 2 Fine: $1850.00 
Suspended: $1850.00 
Total Fine: $9900.00 
Total Suspended: $9400.00 
Total Surcharge: $243.24 
Total Principal Due: $500.00 
Plus Interest 
SCHEDULED TIMEPAY 
The following cases are on timepay 031701596. 
The defendant is to pay $50.00 monthly on the 30th. 
The number of payments scheduled is 9. 
The first payment is due on 5/30/2004 the final payment of .$58.18 
is due on 02/28/2005. The final payment may vary based on 
interest. 
ORDER OF PROBATION 
The defendant is placed on probation for 18 month(s). 
Probation is to be supervised by POSITIVE ADJUSTMENTS. 
Defendant to serve 40 day(s) jail. 
Defendant is to report to the Davis County Jail. 
Defendant is to pay a fine of 500.00 which includes the surcharge. 
Interest may increase the final amount due. 
Pay fine to The Court. 
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Case No: 031701596 
Date: Apr 16, 2004 
PROBATION CONDITIONS 
CONDUCT: Commit no further violations of the law. 
ALCOHOL: Do not use or possess alcoholic beverages or frequent 
places where alcohol is the chief item for sale. 
EVALUATION: Evaluation by Davis County Alcohol and Drug or Davis 
County Behavioral Health and successful completion of any program 
that they suggest. 
PROGRAM/TREATMENT: Enter, participate in and complete any program, 
counseling or treatment as directed by AP&P. 
OTHER: Do not purchase alcohol for the victim. 
SENTENCE PROBATION SERVICE NOTE 
If Defendant has an alcohol related violation, the Court will 
consider this a violation of probation and it will be a much 
harsher punishment. If antebuse is recommended, Defendant is to 
comply with this recommendation. 
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MS. MANGRUM: No. 
THE COURT: All right. Do you feel like you could 
give fair consideration to both sides if you're called to serve 
on this jury? 
MS. MANGRUM: Yes. 
THE COURT: Thank you very much. 
Anyone else on the back row? 
All right. We're talking about close friends or 
family members who work in law enforcement. On the front row 
there were some hands I know. Mr. — is it Progess? 
MR. PROGESS: Progess. 
THE COURT: All right. Thank you. 
MR. PROGESS: Yes. I have a good friend that's a 
corporate lawyer, and a good friend that's on the Utah Highway 
Patrol. 
THE COURT: All right. I take it your good friend 
who's a corporate lawyer really doesn't get involved in the 
criminal law then, especially. 
MR. PROGESS: No, sir. 
THE COURT: Your friend on the Highway Patrol I 
expect probably does — 
MR. PROGESS: 
THE COURT: -
time to time. 
MR. PROGESS: 
Yes. 
- and probably testifies in court f 
Yes, sir. 
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1 THE COURT: Therefore, would you be inclined to give 
2 more credibility to a police officer who testifies as opposed 
3 to a lay witness in court? 
4 MR. PROGESS: I don't know if I'd give more 
5 I credibility, but I think they probably pay attention to detail 
6 I a little bit more than the average person. 
7 THE COURT: At this stage of the proceedings, would 
8 your tendency be to favor the prosecution over the defense? 
9 MR. PROGESS: No. 
10 THE COURT: All right. Anyone else on the front row? 
11 Mr. Munson. 
12 MR. MUNSON: Because I work at Lagoon, I work with — 
13 have worked with several Farmington City police and also the 
14 | sheriff, and three in particular are pretty close friends from 
15 the Davis County sheriff's department. 
16 I THE COURT: Okay. We're going to have some Davis 
17 County sheriff people testify. Are you going to be more 
18 inclined at this stage to give their testimony more credibility 
19 simply because they're with the Davis County Sheriff's Office? 
20 MR. MUNSON: I don't think so. 
21 THE COURT: Can I pursue that a bit? 
22 MR. ?: (inaudible). 
23 THE COURT: Let me ask you a question, if I may, and 
24 again I ask you this just because all of us are nothing more 
25 than the sum total of our life's experience. We have friends 
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1 from all different walks of life, and so sometimes it's hard 
2 for us to evaluate where we are in this circumstance we find 
3 ourselves in today where we may be called upon to serve on a 
4 jury. 
5 So with those comments by way of a predicate, let me 
6 give you a hypothetical. If you were seated here at defense 
7 table as the defendant, and somebody is in the jury with a 
8 close relationship between an agency who will be testifying in 
9 that trial, would you be uncomfortable? 
i 
10 MR. MUNSON: Yeah, I think so. ! 
i 
11 THE COURT: I appreciate your candor. My sense is 
12 that if it were me, I probably would be, too. So what I think ; 
13 the appropriate thing to do is, Mr. Munson, excuse you, if you i 
14 don't mind — J 
15 MR. MUNSON: Okay. j 
16 THE COURT: - and we'll call another to take your | 
17 place. And I say that not in terms of any negative fashion, I 
18 but just the fact that your experience, given the nature of 
i 
19 this case, probably suggests that maybe somebody that has some 
20 other kind of experience would be better suited to be on the 
i 
21 jury, whereas in another circumstance, that may be a case where | 
22 you ought to be on the jury. So I hope you don't mind our 
23 taking this action. 
24 MR. MUNSON: Okay. 
25 THE COURT: Thank you very much. 
23 
MR. POLL: And, your Honor, we don't have any 
witnesses from the Davis County sheriff's office. 
THE COURT: Well, I understand that, but you have 
police officers here in Davis County. 
MR. POLL: That's correct. 
THE COURT: All right. Thank you. Let's proceed. 
THE CLERK: Chantelle Schow. 
THE COURT: Ms. Schow, let us catch you up, please. 
Would you answer the questions on the white board? 
MS. SCHOW: My name is Chantelle Schow. I live in 
Clinton. I'm married. I have two children, six and three. I 
have a high-school education. I am currently a homemaker. My 
husband is in network information. And in my spare time I like 
to read, play with my children, and networking. 
THE COURT: Thank you. Please be seated. Are you 
acquainted with Mr. Poll or any witnesses whom he introduced? 
MS. SCHOW: No. 
THE COURT: Or Mr. Arrington or the defendant in this 
case? 
MS. SCHOW: No. 
THE COURT: Have you heard anything about the case 
from any source? 
MS. SCHOW: No. 
THE COURT: Have you served on a jury in the past? 
MS. SCHOW: No. 
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THE COURT: Do you have any difficulty in given us 
your best effort during this one day of trial? 
MS. SCHOW: No. 
THE COURT: All right. Do you have a close friend or 
family member that's ever been the victim of a crime? 
MS. SCHOW 
THE COURT 
MS. SCHOW 
No. 
Or charged with a crime? 
I have a brother that was charged with a 
DUI, 
THE COURT: All right. How long ago was that? 
MS. SCHOW: Three years ago. 
THE COURT: And was that handled as part of the 
judicial system? 
MS. SCHOW: It was settled out of court. 
THE COURT: All right. Was there anything about that 
that would cause you to have any negative feelings about the 
judicial system? 
MS. SCHOW: No. 
THE COURT: Or would it cause you to favor one side 
over the other at this stage in this case? 
MS. SCHOW: No. 
THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. Do you have any 
friends or family members that work in law enforcement? 
MS. SCHOW: I have a brother that works at Box Elder. 
THE COURT: As a sheriff? 
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1 MS. SCHOW: No. Juvenile work. 
2 THE COURT: So he's in the juvenile system? 
3 MS. SCHOW: Uh-huh (affirmative). 
4 THE COURT: Would that cause you in this trial to 
5 favor a police officer's testimony over a non-police officer's 
6 testimony simply because they're a police officer? 
7 MS. SCHOW: No. 
8 THE COURT: All right. Thank you. All right. Is 
9 there anyone else that we haven't talked to that had 
10 association with law-enforcement people? 
11 All right. Let's go to Ms. Carlos, and then we'll 
12 come back to you, Mr. Johnson. 
13 MS. CARLOS: My brother-in-law is an officer for 
14 Sunset City. 
15 THE COURT: All right. And the same questions then 
16 would apply in your case.. Does that cause you in this case to 
17 favor one side over the other at this stage? 
18 MS. CARLOS: Well, I - I mean possibly. 
19 THE COURT: Is that the reason for your hesitancy? 
20 MS. CARLOS: Yes. 
21 THE COURT: Okay. So you think maybe it would 
22 influence you? 
23 MS. CARLOS: Possibly yeah, it would. 
24 THE COURT: All right. Again, I appreciate your 
25 candor. We'll excuse you, Ms. Carlos. 
26 
Now, before we call another to take your place, let 
me just talk for a minute to you, Mr. Johnson. What's your 
knowledge or friendship with law-enforcement people? 
MR. JOHNSON: I have friends in Kaysville City that 
work for Kaysville — Layton also on the UHP. 
THE COURT: All right. And again, would that cause 
you to favor the testimony of a police officer in the sense 
that you would give that officer more credibility simply 
because they're police officers? 
MR. JOHNSON: I do believe so. 
THE COURT: I'm going to release you, too, 
Mr. Johnson. Thank you. 
And I'll ask the clerk to call two names. The first 
will take the place of Ms. Carlos, the second Mr. Johnson. 
THE CLERK: Kathleen Marie White. 
THE COURT: Ms. White, if you would be seated where 
Ms. Carlos was seated, we would appreciate that. 
THE CLERK: And Melanie Ann MacFarlane. 
THE COURT: And Ms. MacFarlane, please be seated in 
Mr. Johnson's chair. And if we may, ladies, we'll want to 
catch you up. Let's start with you, Ms. MacFarlane. Would you 
answer the questions on the white board, please? 
MR. MacFARLANE: Yeah. I'm Melanie MacFarlane. I 
live in Sunset. I'm single. I have a high-school diploma. I 
work at the driver's license division in Brigham City. And I 
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1 like to read (inaudible). 
2 THE COURT: All right. Thank you very much. 
3 Ms. White, likewise would you answer those questions? 
4 MS. WHITE: I'm Kathleen White. I live in Layton. 
5 I'm married. I have an eleven-year-old daughter. I finished 
6 my junior year of college, theater-arts major. I'm a homemaker 
7 now. My spouse's occupation is a technical engineer at 
8 Hill Air Force Base. And spare time, I like reading science 
9 fiction and fantasy. 
10 I THE COURT: All right. Thank you. Now, let me ask 
11 you two ladies together, if I may. Do either of you know 
12 Mr. Poll or the persons whom he introduced? 
13 MS. WHITE: No. 
14 MS. MacFARLANE: No. 
15 THE COURT: Do you know Mr. Arrington or the 
16 defendant in this case. 
17 MS. MacFARLANE: No. 
18 MS. WHITE: No. 
19 THE COURT: All right. Have either of you heard 
20 anything about the case from any source? 
21 MS. MacFARLANE: No. 
22 MS. WHITE: No. 
23 THE COURT: Have either of you been on a jury in the 
24 past? 
25 MS. WHITE: No. 
1 MS. MacFARLANE: No. 
2 | THE COURT: Okay. Do either of you have difficulty 
! 
3 giving us your best efforts today during this one-day trial? i 
4 MS. WHITE: No. 
5 MS. MacFARLANE: No. 
6 THE COURT: All right. Thank you. Do either of you 
7 have a close friend or family member that's ever been the 
8 victim of a crime or been charged with a crime?. 
9 MS. MacFARLANE: No. 
10 MS. WHITE: No. 
11 THE COURT: Okay. Do either of you have close 
12 friends or family members that work in law enforcement? And 
13 the answer is no. All right. Thank you. 
14 | Now, is there anyone else on the law-enforcement 
15 issue that I've overlooked here? 
16 Ms. Mangrum. 
17 MS. MANGRUM: When he was introducing the officers, 
18 there was an officer I noticed in the courtroom, but I didn't 
19 hear his name called with the two officers. 
20 THE COURT: Could you indicate the witnesses, 
21 Mr. Poll? 
22 MR. POLL: Our two officers are Phil Rogers and 
23 Andrew Bryson. There was another officer that was briefly in 
24 here. It was John Herndon. He's not a witness. 
25 MS. MANGRUM: I've seen John Herndon, I think -
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1 THE COURT: Okay. 
2 MS. MANGRUM: - in the paper. 
3 THE COURT: All right. Thank you. I 
4 Ladies and gentlemen, let me move to one other area 
j 
5 then, if I may, that deals with criminal law, and I'm going to j 
6 ask this question to the panel as a whole. In our system of 
7 criminal justice, when a person is charged with a criminal 
8 offense, they are presumed to be innocent until they're proven 
9 guilty by the prosecution, and the nature of that proof must be 
10 beyond a reasonable doubt. So the fact that a person is 
11 charged with a crime, as a matter of law they are presumed to 
12 be innocent until the prosecution overcomes that presumption. 
13 So is there any of you that cannot give the defendant 
14 the presumption of innocence as you see him today seated here 
15 at defense counsel table? If there are any of you who feel you 
16 cannot do that, would you please raise your hand? All right. 
17 Thank you very much. 
18 Now, you've heard me ask a number of you about police 
19 officers. I'm going to ask this to the whole panel because 
20 this question hasn't been given to all of you. Is there anyone 
21 on the panel who would believe or feel that the testimony of a 
22 police officer, simply for that reason only, is more credible a 
23 lay-witness person who testifies? If so raise your hand. 
24 Mr. Northrop. 
25 MR. NORTHROP: I would think so just because they're 
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iii ; ne s y s t e m more and t h e y ' r e more a r o u n d ' M i s L^nci of 
UU:.: .: ;:t.'SS . I ! i t.'\- ^l\^\ i -. : . "- .; : :'-.'>: C l t M i l . ;•:. 
THE COURT: We:-.i . , • appreciate your — 
THE COURT: appreciate ycur comment, aoout that, 
sir, Dii' I thin)- ' ' r- go: ng to excuse you f if I may, and we'll 
call another >( take your place. 
THE CLERK: Pussell Jay Yahne. 
THE COI JR" * ,K , \ x 
chair, please? 
Ml-!, OOOPEP; '\rt'' yon M :-i k i n« < im I ' « leave? 
THE COURT : Oh, i i< : • , I • m i lot Mr . Northrop. I'm,. 
sorry, Mr. Cooper. 
MI<' . OOOPEP i W<•! ! , 1 a m i d ubi i ge . 
THE COURT: That was close, huh? AJ 1 right. 
h i 1 ci i 1 o \ / ci o ;y c i i p: r o i I o i 11 I c e y o i i r i I a n: i e , s :i r ? 
MR YAHNE: Yahne. 
THE COI JRT i Yahne ? - • ,c , / • ] ] 1 lave 
to catch you up. Wou1d you answer the questions on the white 
board, please? 
Ml YAHNE: ukay. My name is Jay l ahne. I I i ve i n 
Layton, Utah i' in married. I have one daughter, seven months. 
My edi icat i on i s I have a master '" s degree • • . or J : < >.,I _,: j, 
My occupation is I own a geotechnical engineering firm in 
Layton. My wife's occi ipati on i s si le 'works part t.i me w:i tl i me :n 
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